This
article appears in the June
22, 2001 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.
KLA and
Drugs:
The `New Colombia of Europe'
Grows in Balkans
by
Umberto Pascali
A
large black spot, like ink on a piece of blotting paper, is spreading
across the map of Europe. At this very moment, Kosovo, Albania, and a
large part of the Balkans have been swallowed up, and tentacles are
stretching out across the Black Sea, through the Caucasus, to merge with
another such spot centered around Afghanistan. The "spot" does
not respect national borders or ideological, ethnic, or religious
differences, it just keeps spreading, bringing misery and destruction—on
which it thrives. The "spot" is what was, until recently,
labelled as the "black economy," or "illegal economy,"
or organized crime. In fact, it is a much more pervasive and totalitarian
phenomenon. It represents the creation of a new perverse form of society:
a modern form of feudal anarchy.
We
are no longer facing societies penetrated by or hosting the parasitical
"black economy"; we are facing societies dominated by it in
every aspect. We are facing entities that, by virtue of this perverse
system, are financially and otherwise more powerful than nation-states in
the region. Such entities are not "passive"; on the contrary,
they are extremely aggressive, and by their nature, expansionist. As in
the metaphor of the she-wolf in Dante's Divine Comedy, "after
eating, [they] are hungrier than before." Almost by their nature,
they are based on, and at the same time spread a violent, artificial,
fanatical ideology. And, on that basis, they secrete ferociously
chauvinist, paramilitary formations, not much different in their belief
structure, mutatis mutandis, from the youth recruited and trained
by the Nazi or Fascist movements.
Of
course, this kind of phenomenon is not new in history. It was widespread,
for example, in Europe during the Thirty Years War, or earlier, during the
collapse of the Roman Empire. The emergence of the nation-state rolled
back feudal anarchy. The difference in its resurgence today, is that it is
not spontaneous, but rather, it is sponsored and protected.
'National
Security' Drug-Running
In
general, the official justification for support for such groups, is that a
particular group, even if devoted to criminal activities, "must"
be supported, on behalf of some higher necessity, often "national
security." This was the justification for the support by British and
U.S. agencies to the Afghan mujahideen after the 1979 Soviet invasion of
that country; as for that given to the Nicaraguan Contras. Both groups
financed themselves, and a much bigger structure, with a huge traffic in
cocaine, in the case of the Contras, and opium/heroin in the case of the
Afghanistan "freedom fighters." This was tolerated, or even
aided, by Western agencies.
In
Afghanistan, the production of opium under the present Taliban regime has
continued to expand, and, as we shall see, presently the main axis
controlling more than 80% of the heroin market in Europe (plus a growing
slice of the heroin market in other areas, including the United States) is
the Afghanistan-Kosovo axis. Or better, a Taliban-Kosovo Liberation Army
axis.
One
of the targets of the Taliban machine in Asia is the Russian province of
Chechnya. Here, a fundamentalist "freedom fighter" organization,
heavily financed and armed, has been trying to repeat the Afghan
enterprise of the 1980s. The model is the same: "Western"
support; terrorism, use of organized crime and drug trafficking, forced
recruitment; and violent imposition of feudal loyalty on the population on
behalf of a cult-like fundamentalism.
Besides
Chechnya, basically all of the southern region of Russia and almost all of
the former Soviet states have been affected by growing terrorist movements
with an Islamic fundamentalist façade, all easily traceable to the
Taliban and their puppet-masters.
On
May 8, during the commemoration of Victory Day, Russian President Vladimir
Putin did not hesitate to compare the danger of this growing terrorist
machine feeding on drug trafficking, to Fascism and Nazism. He denounced
the peculiar variety of armed radicalism unleashed in southern Russia,
stating that "fascism is only one example of extreme radicalism. At
the end of the 1930s, Europe and the U.S. could not unite to prevent the
Hitlerian aggression, and they paid a heavy price."
Of
course, this destabilizing strategy coincides to the millimeter with
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, et al.'s "Arc of Crisis"
policy, that advocates an explosion of the Muslim areas from South Asia to
the Balkans, to be unleashed against the "north" in an
artificially triggered "Clash of Civilizations." Leaders in many
Muslim countries are disgusted at the support the Taliban receive from the
West, including the extreme ease with which the regime is able to procure
any weapons system imaginable, while a policy of de facto or de
jure embargo, deprives many other Muslim countries from procuring even
the minimum of technology.
The
Taliban-KLA Axis
On
March 18, while his country was in the middle of fending off a ferocious
and well-organized assault by the Kosovo Liberation Army aimed at
provoking a bloody ethnic confrontation between Macedonians and ethnic
Albanians, Macedonia's Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski launched a
dramatic appeal to the nation. "It is obvious that the international
community cannot run away from the fact that this time we are dealing with
the creation of a new Taliban by the Western democracies within
Europe," he said. In a moment of existential danger for his country,
the Prime Minister put his finger in the wound. He indicated in clear
terms what was behind the well-armed, well-trained, and well-financed
gangs that had invaded his country, using as their base a Kosovo province
solidly under the control of NATO's Kosovo Forces (KFOR).
"It
the same old story. Ten [twenty—ed.] years ago we were arming and
equipping the worst elements of the mujahideen in Afghanistan—drug
traffickers, arms smugglers, anti-American terrorists," said Michael
Levine, former U.S. counter-narcotic agent and one of the most decorated
agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in May 1999.
"We later paid the price when the World Trade Center was bombed, and
we learned that some of those responsible had been trained by us. Now
we're doing the same thing with the KLA, which is tied in with every known
Middle and Far Eastern drug cartel. Interpol, Europol, and nearly every
European intelligence and counter-narcotics agency has files open on drug
syndicates that lead right to the KLA, and right to Albanian gangs in this
country."
Levine
explained that "my contacts within the DEA are, quite frankly,
terrified, but there's not much they can say without risking their job.
The Albanian mob is a scary operation. In fact, the Mafia relied on
Albanian hit-men to carry out a lot of their contracts.... And now,
according to my sources in drug enforcement, they are politically
protected."
A
good method to track down the cancerous growth of the "black
spot" is to look at the traffic of illegal drugs, heroin in
particular. Almost all of the heroin circulating in Europe comes through
the Balkans. It is mostly produced from opium cultivated in the Taliban-dominated
Afghanistan and refined in Turkey. It is distributed mostly by the
so-called "Kosovo mafia," whose military excrescence is known as
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or the Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK),
operating inside Serbia as the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja, and
Bujanovac (UCPMB), and in Macedonia as the National Liberation Army (UCK).
Before
we look in some detail at the nightmarish history of the KLA, let's
establish some basic points concerning Afghanistan and the Taliban. It
makes the KLA exploit much clearer.
Who
are the Taliban? The word talib means religious student in Arabic,
for which taliban is the plural. These were originally young boys
and teenagers escaping or forced out of Afghanistan (under Soviet
domination) and set up in refugee camps just across the border in
Pakistan. The youth were indoctrinated in the most brutal and fanatic way.
They became, billions of U.S. and European dollars of weapons aid and
years of warfare later, the leadership of the country, imposing one of the
most obscurantist and repressive regimes in recent history. And now,
Afghanistan has become a center for training and organizing terrorist
groups to be unleashed against neighboring countries. It has consolidated
its control over opium production, and thus, the Taliban enjoy an
inexhaustible financial reserve to pursue their aims.
The
Taliban have come up a long way on the ladder of international organized
crime activity, and many observers believe that such an escalation in such
a strategic and controlled area of the world could not have happened by
chance. Many point out that the leader of the mujahideen who went to fight
in Afghanistan, under the sponsorship of Western agencies, was Osama bin
Laden—the scion of a prominent Saudi family, who is now the most wanted
terrorist in history. (See also "Foreign-Backed Taliban Armies
Threaten Central Asia," EIR, Sept. 8, 2000.)
Bin Laden, Bush, Afghanistan, and Texas
Reportedly,
Osama's half-brother, Sheikh Salem M. bin Laden, was in Texas at the time
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, in charge of his family's
business. The family is one of Saudi Arabia's richest and most powerful,
and owns one the biggest construction companies in the Middle East. Was
Salem involved in the most crucial part of the bin Laden Afghan operation,
namely, the logistics and supplies? According to a PBS Frontline report,
"There was also a political aspect to Salem bin Laden's financial
activities.... Salem bin Laden played a role in the U.S. operations in the
Middle East and Central America during the '80s." In fact, Salem was
gravitating to the highest political, financial, and economic circles in
Texas, where he had arrived in 1973. He also started his own air company,
Bin Laden Aviation, which was incorporated in Austin.
In
1976, he nominated another expert in air transportation, James Bath, as
his trustee. As Pete Brewton, Texas' most informed investigative
journalist, put it: "[In 1976] Bath got a huge break. He was named as
a trustee for Sheikh Salem bin Laden of Saudi Arabia, a member of the
family that owns the largest construction company in the Middle East.
Bath's job was to handle all of bin Laden's North America investments and
operations."
Bath
was an aircraft broker in Houston, a businessman involved in several
private air cargo companies. Apparently, the relation with Salem bin Laden
coincided with an escalation of his activities. He bought several planes
from Air America, the company reputed to be an intelligence front, and in
1979, became the partner of George W. Bush. Bush's father, the future
President, had only recently completed a brief stint in 1976-77, as
director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1979, Bath became George
W. Bush's partner in an oil company called Arbusto (Spanish for
"bush").
As
the Progressive Review explained in 1992, "In 1979, George W.
Bush begins operations of his oil firm, Arbusto Energy. He assembles
several dozen investors in a limited partnership including Dorothy Bush,
Lewis Lehrman, William Draper, and James Bath, a Houston aircraft broker
who bought several planes from Air America, a CIA front. Bath's firm
appears to be owned by Saudi investors. He also was a part-owner of a
Houston's Main Bank, along with a couple of BCCI [Bank of Credit and
Commerce International, later prosecuted and shut down as a
money-laundering bank] figures."
Also
interesting is another Texas account of this story by Jerry Urban in the Houston
Chronicle, June 4, 1992. "The Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network—known as FinCEN—and the FBI are reviewing accusations that
entrepreneur James R. Bath guided money to Houston from Saudi investors
who wanted to influence U.S. policy under the Reagan and Bush
Administrations, sources close to the investigations say....
"According
to [Bath's former real estate business associate Bill] White, Bath told
him that he had assisted the CIA in a liaison role with Saudi Arabia since
1976. Bath has previously denied having worked for the CIA.... Bath
received a 5% interest in the companies that own and operate Houston Gulf
Airport after purchasing it on behalf of bin Laden in 1977."
Salem
bin Laden died in a 1988 plane crash. Bin Laden Aviation was immediately
dissolved. The PBS Frontline web page, in its report entitled
"Origins of the bin Laden Family," said that "Salem bin
Laden's accidental death revived some speculation that he might have been
'eliminated' as an 'embarrassing witness.' "
Opium War on
Russia and West Europe
In
the years of Salem bin Laden's business activities in Texas and Osama bin
Laden's guerrilla activities in Afghanistan, the Afghan
"operation" was not seen as embarrassing in the official world
of Washington or London. Contrary to the dirty connection of the U.S.
National Security Council's Lt. Col. Oliver North with the Nicaraguan
Contras, the support for the Afghan "freedom fighters" was
official, including substantial funds approved by the U.S. Senate.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the surrounding area paid a high price for this
policy. The country was destroyed not only physically, but also
culturally; now, also in the grip of a terrible three-year drought, it is
comparable to Pol Pot's Cambodia.
An
integral part of the policy was the increase in opium production. The drug
addiction statistics available for Pakistan, explain the terrible crime
committed there. Pakistan has the highest number of heroin addicts per
capita in the world. In 1980, before the start of the Afghan operation,
there was virtually no consumption of heroin in Pakistan.
In
1988, when the Soviet troops withdrew, Afghanistan and bordering areas in
Pakistan were producing about 955 tons of opium per year, one-third of the
world's production. A tremendous financial resource was placed in the
hands of the Taliban. The opium, refined mostly in Turkey, was smuggled
into Europe by the Turkish mafia, which dominated the so-called Balkan
Route, previously given the misleading name of the "Bulgarian
Connection." Heroin was coming into Europe through Yugoslavia, and
part of it was consistently shipped into Italy from Albania and
Montenegro.
But
suddenly, a new organized-crime cartel emerged, the Albanian mafia, or
better, the Kosovo mafia.
In
1996, the DEA, in a report prepared for the National Narcotics
Intelligence Consumers Committee, stressed: "Drug-trafficking
organizations composed of ethnic Albanians from Serbia's Kosovo Province
were considered to be second only to Turkish groups as the predominant
heroin smugglers along the Balkan Route. These groups were particularly
active in Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia.
Kosovan traffickers were noted for their use of violence and for their
involvement in international weapons trafficking. There is increasing
evidence that ethnic criminals from the Balkans are engaged in criminal
activities in the United States and some of that activity involves theft
of licit pharmaceutical products for illicit street distribution."
In
the section on Southwest Asia, the report noted: "Despite the
country's political shift to Islamic fundamentalism, Afghanistan
maintained its position as the second largest producer of opium in the
world." The report pointed out that Afghanistan's opium production
went through "six straight years of increases during which the crop
more than tripled." It also admitted, that "according to the
United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), total opium production is
much higher [than the DEA's figures]. Relying on an in-country survey of
Afghan opium poppy farmers, the UNDCP estimates a potential opium yield of
2,336 metric tons from 56,824 hectares of opium poppies."
In
a euphemistic passage, the DEA's report noticed with disappointment that
"despite early pronouncements on their aversion to drug cultivation
and production, the Taliban appears to have reached an accommodation with
opium poppy farmers." It was much more than an
"accommodation," of course. From then on, the Taliban's opium
invasion of Europe increased, and with it, the power and the criminal
machine of the Kosovo mafia and the KLA skyrocketted as well.
Several
intelligence reports have stated that bin Laden and his organization, al-Qaeda,
have both trained and financially supported the KLA. Bin Laden has been
connected to one of the most prominent "staging areas" for the
KLA, before the terrorist organization took over Kosovo with the help of
78 days of air bombing and war by NATO in 1999. The "staging
area" is the Albanian town of Tropoje.
KLA: From Hoxha to Albright
Though
the KLA emerged in the international media only at the end of the 1990s,
the organization goes back at least to 1982, when the Albanian dictator
Enver Hoxha—who controlled Albania with an iron fist and a cult-like
radicalism from World War II to the early 1980s—was pushing with every
means the Greater Albania project. The first modern sponsor of Greater
Albania was Hoxha, who called for the union of all Albanians—including
Albania, Kosovo, the southern part of Serbia, the northwestern part of
Macedonia, the northern part of Greece—especially after the death of
Yugoslavia's President Josip Broz Tito in 1980.
The
Kosovo radical hard-core created international centers in Switzerland,
Germany, and other European cities, in addition to Hoxha's Albania. The
KLA's original core went through a large number of elaborated
Marxist-Leninist party names, mixing up the idea of Greater Albania with
radical Hoxha thought.
They
were kept in a state of political suspended animation, with minor spurts
of activity, until Bosnia's Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. Then they were
activated to take advantage of the wave of resentment which spread through
the Kosovars for having been "left out" of the Dayton agreement
(the province had lost its autonomy in 1989, in a Serbian decision pushed
through by then emerging leader Slobodan Milosevic).
Of
course, there were a lot of political activities in Kosovo itself among
the ethnic Albanians, but these had nothing to do with the KLA. The
Kosovars formed a sort of self-declared autonomy under the leadership of
Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK); Rugova advocates
nonviolence and was known as the "Gandhi of the Balkans." Still
now in Kosovo, despite the KLA terror regime, Rugova has the support of
the ethnic Albanians. However, the KLA usurped Rugova's leadership thanks
to two elements: first, the unconditional support of U.S. and British
leaders, in particular then-U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (a
protégé of George Soros and Zbigniew Brzezinski) and British Prime
Minister Tony Blair; and second, the support of the Kosovo mafia.
At
the 1999 negotiations supposedly to peacefully settle the turmoil between
Serbia and Kosovo, in Rambouillet, France, Albright imposed the young KLA
political leader, Hashim Thaci, rumored to be the scion of an important
family at the center of organized crime in Kosovo, as the top
representative of the ethnic Albanians. Rugova was pushed brutally aside.
In fact, the KLA had been engaged for a long time in a "manhunt"
against Rugova and his leading officials, using intimidation, violence,
even murder. The KLA had dedicated more time and resources to attacking
ethnic Albanians around Rugova, than it did to opposing the Serbian
regime. As we shall see, the same tactics are being repeated right now in
Macedonia.
Rugova
himself had expressed some perplexity when the KLA began escalating its
terror activities, expressing his suspicion that the guerrillas could just
be provocateurs, sponsored by Yugoslav President Milosevic, to provide the
pretext to bring Kosovo again under control.
At
the moment of the so-called peace negotiations in Rambouillet, a NATO
assault on Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo had already been decided. The
use of the KLA gangs inside Kosovo, especially to "triangulate"
and guide the air bombings from the ground, had also been decided. The
training of the KLA had been going on for a long time.
The Colombia
of Europe
The
NATO air campaign increased the power of the Kosovo mafia dramatically, in
terms of its criminal activities and its control over the population, by
eliminating every obstacle, even the vestige of a narcotics police. The
bombing campaign also fed the KLA's predisposition to broaden its area of
control, starting with Serbia and Macedonia.
One
year after the bombing, when many think-tanks made their first thorough
analysis, the situation looked appalling. NATO's 78 days of bombings had
included the use more than 1,000 aircraft to fly more than 38,000
"sorties" at a cost estimated in the tens of billions dollars.
About 40,000 men had been deployed in Kosovo, while reconstruction had not
taken place at all. But the KLA, under the NATO umbrella, became the
absolute master of Kosovo, and the Kosovo mafia became one of the leading
criminal organizations in the world. Another year later, at the beginning
of 2001, the KLA was ready to launch its well-organized expansionist
assault on two sovereign countries, Macedonia and Yugoslavia, using
NATO-administered Kosovo as its base.
Under
the cease-fire agreement of June 1999, the KLA was supposed to disarm and
disband. The 5,000 KLA guerrillas were to join the unarmed, civil
protection Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) under the leadership of the KLA
military commander, Agim Cequ. Cequ is a former general in the Croatian
army, reportedly trained by Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI),
a U.S. firm based in Alexandria, Virginia. MPRI includes on its board some
of the highest-level retired U.S. military officers and is specialized in
"privately" arming, training, and "advising" foreign
governments and foreign groups, including the KLA (see box).
The
KLA is better armed than ever, according to observers, and based on the
findings of secret weapons caches in Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia.
Evidence is also piling up that the structure of the KLA-KPC coincides
with that of the Kosovo mafia. The Albright-sponsored Thaci continues to
be the political leader of Kosovo, despite the fact that his political
adversary, Ibrahim Rugova, can still count on the large majority of the
Kosovo-Albanian votes. "Kosovo is set to become the cancer center of
Europe, as Western Europe will soon discover," stated Marko Nikovic,
vice-president of the New York-based International Narcotic Enforcement
Officers Association, speaking to the London Guardian March 13,
2000, one year after the NATO bombing campaign had officially installed
the KLA in power in Kosovo.
"It
is the hardest narcotics ring to crack, because it is all run by
families," said Nikovic, who estimated that as of March 2000, the
Kosovo mafia was handling between four and a half and five tons of heroin
a month, and growing fast, compared with two tons per month before NATO
and the KLA took over the province. "It's coming through easier and
cheaper, and there is much more of it. The price is going down, and if
this goes on, we are predicting a heroin boom in Western Europe, as there
was in the early '80s"—i.e., the boom due to the increase in opium
production in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Afghanistan war. Sources
in the Balkans have confirmed that the Kosovo mafia bosses, divided into
four major families, are concentrating even more on Western European and
U.S. markets. A high-level informant admitted, "There is nobody to
stop them."
"Kosovo
is the Colombia of Europe," Nikovic explained. "When Serb police
[during the ruthless retaliation for the KLA assassination of Yugoslav
police officers, which led to the NATO intervention] were burning houses
in Kosovo, they were finding heroin stuffed in the roof. As far as I know
there has not been a single report in the last year of KFOR seizing
heroin. You have an entire country without a police force that knows what
is going on. Everything is worked out on the basis of the family or clan
structure—their diaspora have been in Turkey and Germany since Tito's
purges, so the whole route is set up. Now they have found the one country
between Asia and Europe that is not a member of Interpol."
NATO Troops Do Not Police
Under
the NATO protectorate, Kosovo organized-crime activities have been left officially
undisturbed for a long time. "Generals do not want to turn their
troops into cops.... They don't want their troops to get shot pursuing
black marketeers," a top NATO official in the Brussels headquarters
told a reporter.
"The
KLA is indebted to Balkan drug organizations that helped funnel both cash
and arms to the guerrillas before and after the conflict," according
to a report published by the U.S.-based Stratfor Global Intelligence
on March 3, 2000, entitled "Kosovo: One Year Later." "Kosovo
is the heart of a heroin trafficking route that runs from Afghanistan
through Turkey and the Balkans and into Western Europe.... The KLA must
now pay back the organized crime elements. This would in turn create a
surge in heroin traffic in the coming months, just as it did following the
NATO occupation of Bosnia in the mid-1990s.... The route connecting the
Taliban-run opium fields of Afghanistan to Western Europe's heroin market
is dominated by the Kosovo Albanians; this 'Balkan Route' supplied 80% of
Europe's heroin. The U.S. government has been—and likely continues to
be—well aware of the heroin trade coming through Kosovo, as well as the
KLA connection.... For the KLA, the Balkan route is not only a way to ship
heroin to Europe, but it has also acted as a conduit for weapons filtering
into the war-torn Balkans."
According
to a NATO report which surfaced in June 1999, after the end of the
bombings, "the smugglers" either trade drugs directly for
weapons or buy weapons with drug earnings in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia,
Cyprus, Italy, Montenegro, Switzerland, or Turkey. The arsenal of weapons
smuggled into Kosovo has included: anti-aircraft missiles, assault rifles,
sniper rifles, mortars, grenade launchers, anti-personnel mines, and
infrared night vision gear.
More Powerful Than a State
On
Feb. 1, 1995, the British Jane's Intelligence Review, considered
very close to intelligence circles, wrote an analysis called "The
Balkan Medellín," which described a scenario in which Macedonia
would became the target of "Albanian narco-terrorism,"
especially using the "Albanian-dominated region of western
Macedonia," an area dominated by drug trafficking that makes it much
"richer" than the rest of Macedonia.
In
fact, the Jane's report was pointing to the well-known fact that
the border area between Kosovo, Albania, Serbia proper, and Macedonia has
been, at least since the 1970s, an important center for illegal
activities. Of course, until the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s
there was no border between Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia proper. Albania
was a rigidly isolated country; however there were still many relations
and exchanges between Albania and the Albanian community in Kosovo. This
situation was exploited fully by the Albanian mafia, and Kosovo became an
area of choice, because of the ease of running traffic through this
province. It was in this cross-border area—including southern Serbia,
western Macedonia, and northern Albania, with Kosovo at its center—where
the illegal smuggling had established a well-organized logistical
apparatus, that the KLA emerged. This trans-border area is also the region
that is supposed to constitute "Greater Albania." "The
Albanian-dominated region of Western Macedonia accounts for a
disproportionate share of Macedonia's shrinking GDP," reads the 1995 Jane's
report. "This situation has strengthened Albanophobic sentiments
among the ethnic Macedonian majority, especially as a great deal of
revenue is thought to derive from Albanian narco-terrorism as well as
associated gun-running and cross-border smuggling to and from Albania,
Bulgaria and the Kosovo province of Serbia. This rising Albanian economic
power is helping to turn the Balkans into a hub of criminality.... [The
Albanian mafia is] closely associated to the powerful Sicilian mafia. If
left unchecked, this growing Albanian narco-terrorism could lead to a
Colombian syndrome in the Southern Balkans, or the emergence of a
situation in which the Albanian mafia becomes powerful enough to control
one or more states in the region. In practical terms this will involve
Albania or Macedonia or both. Politically, this is been done by channeling
growing foreign-exchange profits from narco-terrorism into local
governments and political parties."
In
other words, the 1995 British report was presenting the scenario that was
later on actually implemented by the KLA. As of this writing, in June
2001, what is at stake in the ongoing KLA assault on Macedonia is whether
the KLA mafia has become powerful enough to "break away" from
its high-level sponsors, and whether it is ready to take control of
Macedonia, after having taken over large part of Albania and the totality
of Kosovo.
Concerning
the Sicilian mafia. It is important to note that a whole new mafia branch
has developed with a dramatic accumulation of power, as a direct
consequence of the Albanian mafia escalation. It is the mafia based in
Apulia, just across the Otranto Canal from Albania. It calls itself Sacra
Corona Unità (Holy United Crown).
Confirming
the existence of an integrated organized-crime network across the
Yugoslavia-Albania borders, later used to develop the KLA structure, was a
June 1994 report by The Geopolitical Drug Dispatch. The Dispatch, a French
center for research and analysis on drug traffic that advises governments,
in a report titled "Guns and Ammo for 'Greater Albania,' "
pointed out: "Heroin shipment and marketing networks are taking root
among ethnic Albanian communities in Albania, Macedonia and the Kosovo
province of Serbia, in order to finance large purchases of weapons
destined not only for the current conflict in Bosnia, but also for the
brewing war in Kosovo. Hence on May 18, as part of a ten-month-old
operation code-named 'Macedonia,' the Italian police dismantled a major
Italian-Macedonian network and seized 40 kilograms of heroin produced in
Turkey and shipped to Italy via the Balkans.
"In
recent months," the report continues, "significant quantities of
heroin have been seized in Switzerland, Germany, Italy and Greece, from
traffickers who usually hail from Pristina (the Kosovo capital), Skopje
(capital of Macedonia) or Skorda (a large town in Northern Albania)."
Target:
Macedonia
Nikola
Dimitrov, the National Security adviser of Macedonian President Boris
Trajkovski, told the March 21, 2001 Newsweek that "Kosovo has
become the combined Afghanistan and Colombia of the Balkans. There is no
rule of law, no ethnic tolerance, no human rights. Not even an economy,
except foreign aid and organized crime." His interviewer, not a
Macedonian sympathizer, concluded: "A year ago, that sweeping
denunciation would have been easy to dismiss as Slav rhetoric. Now it has
begun to sound plausible."
The
first KLA invasion of Macedonia from Kosovo at the beginning of 2001, had
produced a political shock in the country's leadership, especially when
their strong protest to NATO was met with evasive statements by the
Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, and the other military leaders
responsible for Kosovo. Confronted with the dramatic emergency appeals of
the Macedonians, the NATO officials repeatedly replied that, first, they
were trying to seal the borders, but they really did not see any invasion;
second, that Macedonia should react in a peaceful way and try to negotiate
with the aggressors; and third, the invasion looked like an internal
uprising against the government, and had little to do with outside
factors.
The
attitude of Lord Robertson and his co-thinkers was even more insulting
because it was known in many quarters, that Tanusevci, the Macedonian
village just across the Kosovo border, which the KLA had been occupying
for weeks, was one of the "secret" weapons depots that the KLA
had already built up at the time of the NATO bombing of Kosovo. Reportedly
the Macedonian authorities had been asked to close one or both eyes,
because this operation concerned the war against the Serbs and those
weapons were never to be used against Macedonia.
To
illustrate how the military and the criminal sides of the operation are
connected, it is enough to point out that the same, very high mountain
village of Tanusevci had been for many years one of the smuggling centers
to and from Kosovo. In other words, it had been one of the bases of
operation for the Kosovo mafia. According to observers, the Kosovo mafia's
territorial and logistical structures correspond almost identically to the
KLA logistical structure on the ground.
Furthermore,
the Macedonian authorities knew precisely who the man in charge was for
the Tanusevci operation: Xhavit Hasani, an ethnic Albanian born in
Tanusevci, who is a KLA member wanted in Macedonia for shooting a
policeman. He was also arrested in Kosovo by the KFOR troops following the
murder of Serb civilians.
On
March 18, Prime Minister Georgievski broke the spell that had paralyzed
the country after the Tanusevci invasion and made his dramatic
denunciation of Western support for the "Taliban of Europe."
In
that televised appeal to the nation, the Prime Minister said also:
"It is not a secret for us that this aggression has been prepared,
organized, and conducted with logistics support of parties and structures
from Macedonia's northern neighbor. We refer to the political structure
from Kosovo. We cannot agree with some assessments that developments in
Macedonia are not a result of a spillover of the Kosovo crisis, an
aggression from Kosovo against Macedonia. The reason [for this assessment]
is very simple: if the international community admits that there is an
aggression from Kosovo, then its Kosovo policy for the last two years has
been wrong."
On
March 23, at the summit of the European Union heads of state in Stockholm,
Russia President Vladimir Putin gave his support to his Macedonian
counterpart, Boris Trajkovski. The KLA attack must be faced "in a
robust manner," said Putin, comparing the Macedonian situation to
Chechnya. When, in 1996, Russia withdrew its troops from Chechnya, the
rebels attacked Dagestan. "Had we not taken adequate measures of
reaction, we would have faced much wider problems these days," he
said. If unchecked, the KLA terrorism "will create the conditions for
shaking Europe in its very heart."
More
recently, on May 24, Macedonia began to react to the second KLA
"shock," the invasion of a group of villages just north of
Skopje in the region of Kumanovo. The terrorists used several thousand
civilians as "human shields." And what is Kumanovo? One of the
main centers for the Kosovo mafia; an area where the mob traditionally
enjoys a high level of social control. Reportedly the area has hosted one
of the most modern heroin-processing facilities.
The IMF and the Mafia
To
conclude this overview, it is necessary to emphasize one point: Though the
KLA operation had been prepared for many years, and, as we see, its
connections are international, the trigger element was represented by the
financial, political, and social collapse of Albania in 1997, following
the explosion of the infamous financial pyramid scheme. Many Albanians who
were told to invest all they had in these cancerous speculation
schemes—presented as the epitome of the "free market"—had
lost everything in a matter of days.
It
was a gigantic looting operation of the poorest country in Europe. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) had provided the coup de graçe
when it demanded that the Albanian government and Parliament not pass an
already finalized bill, requiring a "safety" deposit, before
engaging in "pyramid" speculation. The crash was mercilessly
destructive.
Reportedly,
the loot ended up in the safe of some very prestigious Western banks. The
consequence was an explosive rebellion, the collapse of the state, and the
criminalization of a high percentage of the population. Many Albanians
became, from one day to the next, refugees, black marketeers, cannon
fodder for the mafia clans, ready to do everything to survive. The
organized-crime groups (with close links with the Italian Mafia) rapidly
took over the pieces and fed on the misery and destruction of a whole
country.
So,
nobody should pretend to be surprised at the expansion of the
organized-crime activities, at the sight of the escalation of
prostitution, smuggling, trading in refugees, at the sight of the mass of
human beings degraded and sold, as in the darkest days of feudalism. The
cause of that degradation is to be found in those "foreign
investors" and those "financial institutions."
One
of the consequences of the resulting uprising was the looting of the
Albanian armories. A UN study reveals that at least 200,000 Kalashnikov
automatic assault weapons from Albania ended up in the KLA arsenals. A
large number of them ended up in the black market, sold or exchanged for
drugs. At that point, in the opinion of many observers, the situation
became irreversible.
But
the 1997 explosion had deeper roots. The "free-market" reforms
imposed on Albania in 1992 by the IMF and the World Bank had weakened its
economic system. It is symptomatic that the financial pyramid schemes, a
legalized form of gambling, were strongly "suggested" by the
foreign creditors, which grew like mushrooms following the
"loan-shark" policy of the IMF. After having devoured the
Albanian assets privatized by the government under the IMF's prod, they
demanded more.
In
Albania and in Kosovo, many youth and teenagers, surrounded by an
upside-down world dominated by fear, rage, and an abysmal injustice, were
easy prey of the KLA recruiting. From a few hundred men, the KLA became
rapidly an army.
[1]
Pete Brewton, The Mafia, CIA and George Bush—Corruption and Abuse of
Power in the Nation's Highest Office (New York: S.P.I. Books, 1992).
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